In this work we address the practical challenges of training machine learning models on privacy-sensitive datasets by introducing a modular approach that minimizes changes to training algorithms, provides a variety of configuration strategies for the privacy mechanism, and then isolates and simplifies the critical logic that computes the final privacy guarantees. A key challenge is that training algorithms often require estimating many different quantities (vectors) from the same set of examples -for example, gradients of different layers in a deep learning architecture, as well as metrics and batch normalization parameters. Each of these may have different properties like dimensionality, magnitude, and tolerance to noise. By extending previous work on the Moments Accountant for the subsampled Gaussian mechanism, we can provide privacy for such heterogeneous sets of vectors, while also structuring the approach to minimize software engineering challenges.
Introduction
There has been much work recently on integrating differential privacy (DP) techniques into iterative training procedures like stochastic gradient descent [Chaudhuri et al., 2011 , Bassily et al., 2014 , Abadi et al., 2016 , Wu et al., 2017 , Papernot et al., 2017 ; for completeness we provide a formal definition of DP in Appendix A. Although these works differ in the granularity of privacy guarantees offered and the method of privacy accounting, most proposed approaches share the general idea of iteratively computing a model update from training data and then applying the Gaussian mechanism for differential privacy to the update before incorporating it into the model. Our goal in this work is to decouple, to the extent possible, three aspects of integrating a privacy mechanism with the training procedure: a) the specification of the training procedure itself (e.g., stochastic gradient descent with batch normalization and simultaneous collection of accuracy metrics and training data statistics), b) the selection and configuration of the privacy mechanisms to apply to each of the aggregates collected (model gradients, batch normalization weight updates, and metrics), and c) the accounting procedure used to compute a final (ǫ, δ)-DP guarantee.
This separation is critical: the person implementing a) is likely not a DP expert, and this code typically already exists; there are many configuration options for b), which will likely require experimentation, and this configuration logic may become complex; thus isolating the key privacy calculations in c) and keeping them as simple (and well tested) as possible prevents bugs in a) or b) from introducing errors in the calculation of the actual privacy achieved.
While model training is our primary motivation, the approach is applicable to any iterative procedure that fits the following template. We have a database with n records. A record might correspond to a single training example, a "microbatch" of examples, or all of the data from a particular user or entity (e.g., to achieve user-level DP as in McMahan et al. [2018] ). On each round, a random subset of records (a sample) is selected and the training procedure consumes the results of a number of vector queries over that sample; see Table 1 . Such vector queries may include the average gradient for each layer, updates to batch-normalization parameters, or the average value for different training accuracy metrics. We describe a general approach to allocating a privacy budget across each of these queries and analyzing the privacy cost of the complete mechanism, all respecting the decoupling of concerns described earlier. Our analysis builds on the Moments Accountant approach of Abadi et al. [2016] , which applies to a single vector query per round, and generalizes the extension of McMahan et al.
[2018] to multi-vector queries.
We focus on the following basic building block for a single vector. Suppose we have a database X with n records consisting of vectors
and we are interested in estimating the average
. Given a selection probability q, clipping threshold S, and noise scale z, the procedure is:
1. Select a subset of the records R ⊆ [1, . . . , n] by choosing each record with probability q.
The quantity i∈R π S x i + N (0; σ 2 I) is the output of the Gaussian mechanism for sums. As E[|R|] = qn, scaling it by 1/qn produces an unbiased estimate of the average. The noise scale z ≡ σ/S (the ratio of the noise to the L 2 -sensitivity of the query) acts as a knob to trade off privacy vs. utility. If we choose z = 1 ǫ 2 ln 1.25/δ, the mechanism is (qǫ, qδ)-differentially private with respect to the full database [Beimel et al., 2014, Dwork and Roth, 2014] . Importantly, the privacy cost of this mechanism is fully specified by q together with the privacy tuple (S, σ), where S is an upper bound on the L 2 norm of the vectors being summed, and σ is the standard deviation of the noise added to the sum. We generalize the above procedure to the case where each record corresponds to a collection of vectors. We still do the sampling step (1) only once, but we estimate the average of each of the vectors separately, potentially with different clipping thresholds and noise scales. Let (v 1 , . . . , v m ) be the total set of vectors for which averages are to be estimated privately. In general, we may partition this set of m vectors into multiple groups, e.g., fully connected layers vs. convolutional layers vs. metrics. We assume the user (that is, the person using the privacy tools defined here) has identified the relevant set of groups whose averages are needed in the training procedure. For each of these, she needs to specify a privacy mechanism together with some hyperparameters. We first describe the privacy mechanisms that can be applied to individual vectors or groups of vectors, then show how the privacy cost of the full collection of mechanisms can be calculated, and finally propose strategies for choosing the parameters to achieve the desired privacy versus utility tradeoff.
Privacy mechanisms for a group of vectors
In this section, we describe two strategies that can be applied to a single group of vectors, WLOG the first k, (v 1 , . . . , v k ), for k ≤ m; when k = 1, the two mechanisms described are identical.
Separate clipping and noise parameters. This strategy essentially treats the whole group as a single concatenated vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v k ). The user provides S g , a clipping parameter, and σ g , a noise parameter. For now, assume both of these parameters are simply chosen so as to provide reasonable utility for the resulting average; we will discuss strategies for choosing these parameters in detail in Section 4. The output of the mechanism iŝ
, whereσ g = qnσ g . The final expression shows that the mechanism is equivalent to the Gaussian mechanism for sums with privacy tuple (S g ,σ g ). Applying this mechanism with S g = S * to all m vectors recovers the "flat clipping" approach of McMahan et al. [2018] , and applying this mechanism separately to each of the vectors with S g = S * / √ m recovers their "per-layer clipping" approach (where S * is the total L 2 bound). Another reasonable strategy that takes into account dimensionality is to apply the mechanism separately with
Joint clipping. Here we introduce a new mechanism that allows us to clip less aggressively than applying the previous strategy to each vector individually, while still letting different vectors live on different multiplicative scales. The user supplies as input scale parameters α 1 , . . . , α k for v 1 , . . . , v k , an overall σ g the whole group, and a total clipping parameter S g ∈ 1, √ k ; noise α j σ g is added to the estimate for vector v j . The strategy first does a pre-processing step via the scaling operator
but it may typically be less; thus S g = √ k is a conservative default choice. The mechanism's output then scales the vectors back by the α j factor in post-processing:
where againσ g = qnσ g . The final expression shows the output can be written as a post-processing of the subsampled Gaussian mechanism for sums with privacy tuple (S g ,σ g ). Note that if no clipping happens then α j π Sg s(v i ; α 1:k ) j = v i j for all j. To see where this mechanism might be superior to the first, suppose v 1 and v 2 have v 1 ≤ 1 and v 2 ≤ 100, and suppose they can tolerate noise standard deviations of 0.01 and 1 respectively. Additionally, assume it is known that either v i 1 or v i 2 will be zero for any record i. We could clip these separately, but this ignores the (useful) side information that one is always zero. On the other hand, if we treat them as a single group, we cannot take into the account the fact they are on very different scales; in particular, we must pick a single noise value which will either be insufficient to add privacy for v 2 , or will completely obscure the signal in v 1 . The joint mechanism proposed here lets us directly handle this situation using α 1 = 1, α 2 = 100, σ g = 0.01, and S = 1.
Composing privacy guarantees for multiple vector groups
Now, suppose we have partitioned the m vectors into G groups, and selected a privacy mechanism for each one, producing privacy tuples (S g ,σ g ) for g ∈ {1, . . . , G}. From a privacy accounting point of view, each of these mechanisms is equivalent to running a Gaussian sum query on vectors w g with w g ≤ S g and then adding noiseσ g to the final sum. We now demonstrate a transformation that lets us analyze this composite mechanism as a single Gaussian sum query on the sample. 
) 2 . Now, we imagine a single Gaussian sum query with noise standard deviation σ = 1, and output the estimate after rescaling by theσ g factors. This is equivalent sincê
The final expression is a simple post-processing on the output of a single Gaussian sum query with parameters (S * , σ = 1). Thus, we can apply the moments accountant to bound the privacy loss of iterative applications of this mechanism.
Hyperparameter selection strategies
Here we consider selecting hyperparameters q, S g , and σ g to achieve a particular privacy vs. utility tradeoff. Recall for both mechanisms,σ g = qnσ g , so the key quantity is
Typically, a value of z ≈ 1 will provide a reasonable privacy guarantee. If z is too small for the desired level of privacy, the user has several knobs available: clip more aggressively by decreasing the S g 's; noise more aggressively by scaling up the σ g 's; or increasing q. When datasets are large and the additional computational cost of processing larger samples R is affordable, this last approach is generally preferable, as observed by McMahan et al. [2018] . If additionally the total number of iterations T is known, then since the privacy cost scales monotonically with any of these adjustments to z, a binary search can be performed using the moments accountant repeatedly with different parameters to find e.g. the precise value of q needed to achieve a particular (ǫ, δ)-DP guarantee.
Choosing σ g and S g . Typical approaches to setting S g include: 1) using an a priori upper bound on the L 2 norm; 2) choosing S g so that "few" vectors are clipped; or 3) running parameter tuning grids to find a value of S g that does not reduce utility (e.g., the accuracy of the model) by too much. If private data is used in 2) or 3), the privacy cost of this should be accounted for. Similar strategies can be used to choose σ g , e.g., selecting a value that will introduce an a priori acceptable amount of error, or more likely for model training, running experiments to find the largest amount of noise that does not slow the training procedure.
In some cases one may have bounds S g on the norms of G groups plus an overall target value of z, which needs to be distributed across multiple groups. To achieve proportional noise, whereσ g ∝ S g for all g, we can useσ g = z √ GS g . Another reasonable alternative, dimensionality adjusted noise assigns noise proportional to the maximum root mean squared value of the components of w g given its bound and its dimensionality:σ g = z D/d g S g , where d g is the dimensionality of group g.
Privacy ledger
In principle, privacy accounting (via, e.g. the moments accountant) could be done in tandem with calls to the mechanism to keep an online estimate of the (ǫ, δ) privacy guarantee. However we advocate a different approach which cleanly separates concerns b) and c) from the introduction. We maintain a privacy ledger and record two types of events: sampling events, which record that a set R of records has been drawn using parameters q and n, and sum query events, which record that a Gaussian sum query has been performed over some group of vectors with privacy tuple (S g ,σ g ). Then the privacy accountant can process the ledger post hoc to produce a privacy guarantee, first converting each group of one sampling event plus some sum query events to an equivalent single sum query event with parameters (S * , σ = 1) using Equation (1).
There are two main advantages of this approach. First, bugs in the hyperparameter selection strategy code cannot affect the privacy estimate. Second, it allows the privacy accounting mechanism to be changed and the ledger reprocessed if, for example, a tighter bound on the privacy loss is discovered after the data has been processed.
Conclusion
We have shown how the Gaussian mechanism can be applied to vectors of different types with different norm bounds and noise standard deviations, enabling training over heterogeneous parameter vectors, as well as simultaneous privacy-preserving estimation of other statistics such as classifier accuracy, or the number of instances in each class. By implementing iterative training algorithms in terms of a series of Gaussian sum queries and then recording for each query privacy events to a ledger to be processed by a privacy accountant, we separate the three major concerns of implementing privacy-preserving iterative training procedures while allowing flexibility in the specification of clipping strategy and noise allocation.
